Suchergebnisse

AbstractWhy do politicians cluster the distribution of benefits in the run‐up to elections? I suggest that credit claiming is an explanation for political budget cycles. Brazilian rules banning credit claiming before elections while allowing the distribution of benefits until Election Day provides an opportunity to differentiate between distribution and credit claiming combined with distribution as an engine that reinforces political budget cycles. Evidence from housing and conditional‐cash‐transfer programs demonstrates that officials expand these programs before the credit‐claiming ban and halt expansion after the ban yet prior to Election Day. Drawing on social media and qualitative data, I show that politicians use credit claiming to convey information about their competence and attribution. Distribution without attribution reduces the likelihood of political budget cycles compared to distribution with attribution, which together reinforces pre‐election expansion of policy benefits. I rule out rival explanations of clientelism and party favoritism.

How do incumbents prevent the opposition from claiming credit for government programs? The received scholarly wisdom is that central government authorities favor copartisans in lower tiers of government to reward allies and punish opponents. Yet this depiction ignores the range of strategies available to incumbents at the center. I argue that another effective strategy is to channel resources through nonstate organizations, thus bypassing the opposition and reducing "credit hijacking." Using a regression-discontinuity design with data from Brazil, I show that mayors from the president's party receive more resources, but that the election of an opposition mayor induces the central government to shift resources to nonstate organizations that operate in the locality. Original survey data, fieldwork, and data on organizations' leaders support the claim that opposition mayors do not hijack credit from government spending through nonstate organizations.

What explains the persistence of racial or ethnic inequalities in political representation, in the absence of strongly politicized racial or ethnic cleavages? This paper uses new data to demonstrate a substantial racial gap between voters and politicians in Brazil. We show that this disparity is not plausibly due to racial preferences in the electorate - for instance, deference towards white candidates, or discrimination against non-whites. Nor do barriers to candidate entry or discrimination by party leaders likely explain the gap. Instead, we document the importance of persistent resource disparities between whites and non-whites - especially, differences in personal assets and in campaign contributions. Our findings show how the power of numerical racial minorities may persist in democracies, even in the absence of racialized politics, and highlight the role of investments by economic elites in a setting in which race and class substantially overlap.

This paper analyzes federal transfers to not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) in the past twelve years in Brazil. We analyze four points: i) the variations in terms of absolute amount of resources transferred to NPOs from the federal government; ii) the proportion of NPOs transfers relatively to other types of federal transfers, and the growth of transfers to NPOs from state and local governments; iii)in which policy areas are federal transfers to NPOs focused; and iv) the degree of concentration of transferred resources to NPOs. We did not find a clear pattern in terms of the amount of resources transferred to NPOs in the last decade, despite a tendency of growth during this period. There is sharp variation, which contrasts with the steady growth of federal transfers to subnational governments.

For the past half a century, Latin American scholars have been pointing toward the emergence of new social actors as agents of social and political democratization. The first wave of actors was characterized by the emergence of novel agents—mainly, new popular movements—of social transformation. At first, the second wave, epitomized by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), was celebrated as the upsurge of a new civil society, but later on, it was the target of harsh criticism. The literature often portrays this development in Latin American civil society as a displacement trend of actors of the first wave by the second wave—"NGOization"—and even denounces new civil society as rootless, depoliticized, and functional to retrenchment. Thus, supposedly, NGOization encumbers social change. The authors argue that NGOization diagnosis is a flawed depiction of change within civil society. Rather than NGOization related to the depoliticization and neoliberalization of civil society, in Mexico City and São Paulo, there has been modernization of organizational ecologies, changes in the functional status of civil society, and interestingly, specialization aimed at shaping public agenda. The authors argue that such specialization, instead of encumbering social change, brings about different repertoires of strategies and skills purposively developed for influencing policy and politics. Their argument relies on comparative systematic evidence. Through network analysis, they examine the organizational ecology of civil society in Mexico City and São Paulo.

AbstractWe investigated both the direct and indirect political dividends of public policies by examiningMinha Casa,Minha Vida, a housing programme in Brazil that selects its beneficiaries by lottery. We surveyed the lottery participants and found that the winners were not more likely to support the incumbent politicians. Non-beneficiaries, a much larger group, were aware of the programme and thought well of it while the beneficiaries' responses to the programme were sometimes underwhelming. However, politicians considered the programme to be an electoral asset, and a difference-in-differences analysis of electoral results leveraging the roll-out of the programme across municipalities found that presidential and mayoral incumbent candidates performed better in localities that had implemented MCMV. Overall, when the beneficiaries formed a relatively small group, the benefits were conspicuous and the programme's objectives were widely supported. Government programmes can create electoral payoffs independently of how programmes are perceived or experienced by beneficiaries.

This study addresses the phenomenon of misinformation about misinformation, or politicians "crying wolf" over fake news. Strategic and false claims that stories are fake news or deepfakes may benefit politicians by helping them maintain support after a scandal. We posit that this benefit, known as the "liar's dividend," may be achieved through two politician strategies: by invoking informational uncertainty or by encouraging oppositional rallying of core supporters. We administer five survey experiments to over 15,000 American adults detailing hypothetical politician responses to stories describing real politician scandals. We find that claims of misinformation representing both strategies raise politician support across partisan subgroups. These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media. Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal, such as remaining silent or apologizing.

Abstract
Misinformation is widely seen as a threat to democracy that should be promptly addressed by scholars, journalists, and policymakers. However, some of the debated solutions are either controversial (internet platform regulation) or may be difficult and costly to implement in many settings (fact-checking corrections). This study investigates the effectiveness of preemptive interventions, a type of solution that has received considerably less attention in this debate. Studies show that interventions through awareness and media literacy campaigns can inoculate citizens against misinformation, but these interventions are restricted to a few contexts and settings. Our paper uses two field experiments, one of which was conducted in partnership with Brazil's main newspaper, to investigate the effectiveness of multidimensional interventions against misinformation in São Paulo. The findings show that preemptive interventions can indeed reduce rumor acceptance and provide insights into the strategies to combat misinformation in democracies.